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I. INTRODUCTION 
A new era in Canada's constitutional development began on June 
23, 1990, when the proposed Meech Lake Accord 1 (Accord) col-
lapsed. 2 This historic event represented the latest step in the evolu-
tion of Canada's Constitution. The Accord was designed to strike a 
new internal balance, or equilibrium, in Canada's constitutional archi-
tecture. 3 Since the British Parliament statutorily created Canada as a 
legal governmental entity in 1876,4 the nation has struggled with the 
task of establishing a viable Canadian federal structure, sovereign and 
independent from Britain.5 Unfortunately, every scheme or proposal 
has been unacceptable to at least one of the provinces6 and has ended, 
as did the Accord, in failure. 
At the present time, the Canadian national agenda is focused on 
devising a new constitutional order under which all the provinces can 
exist in harmony. Most commentators agree that the current consti-
tutional status quo if left unmodified will be untenable. 7 
1. Meech Lake Accord, June 23, 1987, reprinted in PETER w. HOGG, MEECH LAKE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ACCORD ANNOTATED appendix 1 (1988) [hereinafter ACCORD]. 
2. See John F. Bums, Canada Abandons Accords on Quebec, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1990, 
§ 1 (Foreign Desk), at 1. 
3. See Thomas J. Courchene, Meech Lake and Federalism: Accord or Discord?, in COM-
PETING CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS: THE MEECH LAKE ACCORD 122 (Katherine E. Swinton 
& Carol J. Rogerson eds., 1988) [hereinafter VISIONS]. 
4. British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Viet., ch.3 (U.K.) renamed Constitution 
Act, 1867, by Canada Act, R.S.C., Appendices (No. 44)(1985)(Can.) reprinted in CONSTITU-
TIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbot H. Flanz eds., 1983) 
[hereinafter BNA Act]. 
5. See Joel Bakan & Danielle Pinard, Getting to the Bottom of Meech Lake: A Discussion 
on Some Recent Writings on the 1987 Constitutional Accord, 21 OTTAWA L. REV. 247 (1989). 
See also Cairns, The Canadian Constitutional Experiment, 9 DALHOUSIE L.J. 87 (1984). This 
is commonly referred to as "patriation." The term is uniquely Canadian. It refers to the 
political movement to establish a legal system that does not require British Parliamentary 
consent and Royal assent to amend the Canadian constitution. Id. 
6. See CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 1918 (James H. Marsh, ed., 2d. ed. 1988). Canada is 
comprised of the provinces of British Columbia (1871), Alberta (1905), Saskatchewan (1905), 
Manitoba (1870), Ontario (1867), Quebec (1867), Newfoundland (1949), New Brunswick 
(1867), Nova Scotia (1867), Prince Edward Island (1873), the Yukon (1898) and Northwest 
Territories (1870) (year indicates when entered into union). See id. 
7. See, e.g. , Thomas J. Courchene & John N. McDougall, The Context for Future Consti-
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Quebec, the province which was to benefit the most from the Ac-
cord, renewed its discussions about becoming a sovereign state. 8 In 
September 1990, Quebec created the Commission on the Constitu-
tional and Political Future of Quebec9 (Quebec Commission). The 
Quebec Commission announced in March 1991 that it would give the 
other provinces twenty months to make proposals to Quebec for a 
new Canadian constitutional order. 10 Quebec's government will then 
tum to its people and ask them to decide if Quebec will be associated 
with Canada or move for complete independence. 11 
On the federal level, the Canadian Prime Minister, Brian Mulro-
ney, placed before the Canadian House of Commons a document 
named Shaping Canada's Future Together on September 24, 1991.12 
The document contains twenty-eight proposals for constitutional re-
form including the changes the Accord would have implemented, as 
well as many new suggestions. The Prime Minister has proposed a 
vision for Canada's future which would maintain the current federal 
structure, while moving toward an economic union similar to the Eu-
ropean Community (EC).•3 
Canada's present constitutional dilemma parallels the breakdown 
of other federal structures throughout the world. The individual 
states within the former Soviet Union, India, Yugoslavia and Czecho-
slovakia have become disenchanted with their existing federal orders 
and are experiencing what is referred to as "regional self-determina-
tion."14 Like Quebec, they are now exercising their right to decide by 
which fundamental laws they are to be govemed.1s The dismantling 
of these existing federal structures magnifies the significance of the 
tutional Options, in OPTIONS FOR A NEW CANADA 105 - 09 (Ronald H. Watts & Douglas M. 
Brown eds., 1991) [hereinafter OPTIONS]. 
8. See discussion infra text part 111.C. 
9. See Guy Laforest, Quebec Beyond the Federal Regime of 1867-1982: From Distinct 
Society to National Community, in OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 105 - 06. The Quebec Commis-
sion is officially called La Commission sur l'avenir constitutionnel et po/itique du Quebec. Id. 
10. See John F. Bums, Canadian Leader Appeals for Calm on Quebec Dispute, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 24, 1990, § 1 (Foreign Desk), at 1. 
11. Id. 
12. Shaping a New Future, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 25, 1991, at A23 (reprinting the full 
text of all 28 proposals) [hereinafter Shaping a New Future]. 
13. Id. at proposals 7(11), 14(1), 14(5), 16, 28. 
14. This phrase has been used by Professor Hilary K. Josephs of the Syracuse University 
College of Law to describe this recent global phenomenon. See also Carol Goar, Small Won-
der Foreigners Fear for Canada It'll Take More than Derek Burney's Bravado to Convince 
World We're not Just Another Fragmenting Federation, TORONTO STAR, July 13, 1991, (In-
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historical events in Western Europe where several states have come 
together to form a new legal order, the European Union. 
The creation of the European Union has been an ongoing pro-
cess. In 1951, the Treaty of Paris16 was adopted creating the first 
common market, for coal and steel, in Europe and planting the seeds 
for what became the EC. During the past forty years, this strict eco-
nomic structure has developed slowly, integrating the diverse econo-
mies of the 12 member states into one entity. 17 Agreements between 
the member states form the foundation of the economic legal order to 
which all governments, businesses and citizens of the EC adhere. The 
laws and institutions of the EC are separate from those of member 
states, but they were molded according to the common interests of the 
member nations and several fundamental principles. 18 The European 
Community has recently undertaken the next phase of its develop-
ment. The agreement completed at the Maastricht Summit in De-
cember 1991 19 will transform the sophisticated economic entity into 
one clearly identifiable group, the European Union.20 This agreement 
will strengthen the economic ties by adding an "economic and mone-
tary union" to the EC framework and, independent of the EC, estab-
lish inter-governmental cooperation in the areas of foreign policy and 
security. The legal framework of the European Union has been de-
scribed as a federal constitutional framework. 21 
In response to the Quebec Commission's request for proposals, 
16. Treaty instituting the Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 
[hereinafter ECSC Treaty]. The only authentic version of the treaty is in French. 
17. See P.S.R.F. MATHUSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY LAW 6 (5th ed. 
1990) [hereinafter MATHUSEN 5th]. The member nations of the EC are France, Germany, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, 
and Denmark. Id. 
18. See DOMINIK LASOK & JOHN BRIDGE, LAW & INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES 27 (4th ed. 1987) [hereinafter LASOK]. See also discussion of the Schuman Plan 
infra text part IV .A. 
19. Maastricht Summit Succeeds on EC Economic and Political Union, Eurecom 
(Monthly Bulletin of European Community Economic and Financial News), Vol. 3, No. 11, 
Dec. 1991 [hereinafter Maastricht Summit Succeeds]. The text of the agreement done at Maas-
tricht was not available at the time this article was completed. 
20. Bruce Barnard, Making Sense of Maastricht, EUROPE, Jan./Feb. 1992, at 14 [herein-
after Making Sense of Maastricht]. The European Union refers to a legal order which is com-
prised of a strict economic legal order known as the European Community and the agreements 
concerning inter-governmental cooperation between the member states in areas of foreign pol-
icy and security. 
21. See Prodromos D. Dagtoglou, The Legal Nature of the European Community, in 
THIRTY YEARS OF COMMUNITY LAW 34 - 41 (1983) [hereinafter THIRTY YEARS](two theo-
ries of the European model are discussed: a functional, or federal system, and a supra-national 
organization). See also LASOK, supra note 18 (the authors correlate the EC to either a federal 
system or a confederation). 
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individuals from every field in Canada have been offering suggestions 
for a new federal model. 22 The EC had been suggested as a model for 
solving previous constitutional problems in Canada. 23 Once again, 
scholars are looking to Europe to see if such a system would be viable 
for Canada. 24 
The purpose of this Note is to analyze whether the European 
Union is a viable solution to Canada's disintegrating constitutional 
order. Part II will discuss the historical background of the present 
constitutional order of Canada. It will examine the historical, polit-
ical and social context that brought about changes in Canada's basic 
laws. In part III, the impact that the Meech Lake Accord would have 
had on the present constitutional framework in Canada and the 
events after its failure will be analyzed. Part IV will provide an over-
view of the historical context of the European Union's creation and 
the fundamental principles which guided it. Additionally, its institu-
tions and the completion of the internal market by December 31, 
1992, will be discussed. An overview of the Maastricht Summit will 
be provided to explain how its proposals for economic and monetary 
union as well as political cooperation will change the shape of the 
existing European Union. Finally, part V will outline possible consti-
tutional structures for Canada and analyze the federal government's 
recent proposal. This Note concludes that federal institutions guided 
by fundamental principles governing limited areas of provincial sover-
eignty, like the European Union's, could form a new, socially legiti-
mate Canadian constitutional order. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE EXISTING 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER OF CANADA 
A. The British North America Act, 1867: The Founding 
Instrument 
The three British North American colonies25 were confederated 
22. See generally PHILIP RESNICK, TOWARD A CANADA-QUEBEC UNION (1991) [herein-
after RESNICK]; OPTIONS, supra note 7. 
23. See David Matas, The EEC as a Model for Canada, 10 MANITOBA L.J. 259 
(1980)(citing (1977) Canadian House of Commons Debates, at 3245, per Claude Wagner). 
Matas argued that the EEC model could not work for Canada because the provinces would 
never agree to a system where they would lose aspects of the sovereignty they now enjoy to the 
federal government. Id. at 279. 
24. See Dan Soberman, European Integration: Are there Lessons for Canada?, in OP-
TIONS, supra note 7, at 191. 
25. The colonies brought together were Canada, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. See 
BNA Act, supra note 4, preamble. See also RONALD E. CHEFFINS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROCESS IN CANADA 24 - 25 (1969). 
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on July l, 1867, when the British Parliament enacted the British 
North America Act, 1867 (BNA Act).26 The three separate colonies 
were united into one federation which was divided into four prov-
inces.27 The individuals responsible for establishing the first confed-
eral Canadian legal order were influenced by the constitutional 
experience of the United States28 and the constitutional traditions of 
Great Britain.29 The government, as established by the BNA Act, 
was comparable to the United Kingdom model of government, how-
ever, it divided governmental powers between a central Dominion 
government and provincial governments.30 While the BNA Act pro-
vided the legal framework for, 31 and placed limitations upon,32 the 
Canadian government, it did not provide an internal mechanism to 
amend the law that created the federation. 33 As Canadian legal inde-
pendence from the United Kingdom (U.K.) came to be recognized in 
the twentieth century, the unsuitability of this process became 
apparent. 
In 1919, Canada obtained independent international status when 
the U.K. requested that Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South 
Africa be given separate representation in the assembly of the League 
of Nations.34 Canada's autonomy from the U.K. was evident by its 
participation in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. 3s The irony of an 
26. See BNA Act, supra note 4. 
27. The BNA Act, 1867 created Ontario (formerly Upper Canada), Quebec (formerly 
Lower Canada), Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. See GERALD L. GALL, THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 43 (2d student ed. 1983). 
28. See CARL J. FREIDRICH, THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM ABROAD 
60- 61 (1967). The United States Constitution of 1776 was the written document which influ-
enced the drafting of the federal structure in Canada. In contrast to the U.S. model, where all 
powers remain in the states unless expressly given to the federal government, the BNA Act 
placed all residual powers in the Dominion, the federal government and the provinces have 
only certain enumerated powers. See E. RUSSELL HOPKINS, CONFEDERATION AT THE CROSS-
ROADS 1 (1968). 
29. See GALL, supra note 27, at 46 - 48. See also HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 1. 
30. The preamble of the BNA Act, 1867 states that the "Provinces ... desire to be 
federally united ... with a constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom." 
BNA Act, supra note 4, at preamble. 
31. BNA Act, 1867 creates and enumerates the powers of the branches of the federal 
government: The Executive §§ 9 - 16, The Legislature §§ 17 - 51 (Senate §§ 21-36 and House 
of Commons §§ 37 - 57), and The Judicature§§ 96 - 101. See BNA Act, supra note 4. 
32. BNA Act, supra note 4, at pt. VII. 
33. See NEIL FINKELSTEIN, 1 LASKIN'S CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71 (5th ed. 
1986) [hereinafter LASKIN's]. 
34. See 4 AMOS J. PEASELEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 206 (3d ed. 1970). 
35. See ROBERT M. DAWSON, THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA 47 - 49 (5th ed. 1970). 
For a discussion of Canada's early treaty making see R.J. Delisle, Treaty Making Power in 
Canada, in ONTARIO ADVISORY COMMITTEE CONFEDERATION 115 (1967). 
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apparently sovereign nation having to request amendments for its 
constitution from another state increased with the passage of the Stat-
ute of Westminster, 1931.36 Although this British law provided for 
Canada's independence from the U.K., the U.K. retained complete 
power to amend the BNA Act and the location of a court of final 
appeal. 37 
The issue came into focus once again when Canada accepted 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice in 193038 and again when it became a United Nations member in 
1945.39 During the twentieth century, the federal and provincial gov-
ernments in Canada made repeated efforts to "patriate"40 Canada's 
Constitution, that is, formulate a procedure to amend its basic laws 
without British Parliamentary involvement. 
B. In Search of a Solution 
The search for a satisfactory procedure for amending the Cana-
dian Constitution has been pursued since the Imperial Conference of 
1926. 41 The first significant discussions took place at the Dominion-
Provincial Conference of 1927. 42 The same issue was subsequently 
addressed by federal and provincial leaders in 1935-36, 1950, 1960-61, 
1964, 1971, 1981 and 1987.4 3 
In 1935, a special committee was created by the Canadian House 
of Commons to address the amending problem. 44 Due to the urgency 
of the matter, it called for a Dominion-Provincial conference which 
produced a "Continuing Committee on Constitutional Questions. "4s 
The committee, composed of federal and provincial officials, proposed 
general amending procedures and an amendment to the Statute of 
Westminster to enable the Parliament of Canada to replace the BNA 
36. Statute of Westminster, 1931, R.S., ch. 107 § 2; 1967 - 68; c.7 § 8 cited in Interpreta-
tion Act, R.S.C., ch. 1-23, § ;1967 - 68 (Can.). 
37. See DAWSON, supra note 35, at 48 - 50. 
38. Canada deposited the instrument accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the World 
Court on July 28, 1930, accepted on September 20, 1929, 88 L.N.T.S. 282, ratified on July 28, 
1930, 100 L.N.T.S. 155, and terminated jurisdiction on April 7, 1970, 724 U.N.T.S. 421. 
39. Original signatory nation to U.N. Charter at the San Francisco Conference on June 
26, 1945. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, DocUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CoURT OF JUSTICE 
301 (2d ed. 1979). 
40. See supra note 5. 
41. See GUY FAVREAU, THE AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA (1965). 
42. See DoMINION-PROVINCIAL CONFERENCES 1927, 1935, AND 1941 (1943). 
43. See generally HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 267. 
44. See id. at 268. 
45. Conference Resolution Jan. 8, 1936. Id. 
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Act with a constitution. 46 This new constitution would include an 
amending process that would be exercised completely within Can-
ada. 47 Although no final decision was ever reached, the basic princi-
ple that the establishment of an amendment procedure required 
negotiation between federal and provincial governments guided all 
subsequent conferences. 48 
The concerns of World War II and post-war reconstruction side-
tracked the "amendment procedure" problem until 1950. 49 The 
Right Hon. Louis St. Laurent50 noted that the role of Canada in the 
two World Wars demonstrated its capacity to bear nationhood and he 
put the pursuit of an amending procedure back on the national 
agenda.51 
Accordingly, a Constitutional Conference of federal and provin-
cial officials met in Ottawa in January 1950.52 They proposed that 
provisions of the BNA Act which concerned six different areas should 
each have a different amending procedure. 53 However, no concrete 
decisions were made at this conference and the issue was left open for 
another meeting. s4 
A conference of Attorney Generals met on four occasions 
throughout 1960 and 1961. 55 On December 1, 1961, the meeting pro-
duced a draft proposal called the "Fulton Formula."56 The proposed 
scheme embodied a three-fold amending procedure with provisions 
addressing the delegation of legislative power.57 Saskatchewan and 
Quebec objected to the entrenchment of this formula in the Canadian 
Constitution as it would give the federal government the right to 
46. Id. 
4 7. HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 268. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 268 - 69. 
50. Prime Minister of Canada from 1948 - 57. See 3 THE CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 
1946 (James H. Marsh ed., 2d ed. 1988). 
51. See HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 268 - 69 (citing National Broadcast (CBC radio broad-
cast, May 9, 1949)). 
52. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE OF FEDERAL & PROVIN-
CIAL GOVERNMENTS (1951). First Session: Ottawa, Jan. 10 - 12, 1950; Second Session: Que-
bec, Sept. 25 - 28, 1950. 
53. See LASKIN's, supra note 33, at 74. For example, amendments concerning only the 
Canadian Parliament could be made by an act of the Canadian Parliament alone. Id. 
54. See HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 269. 
55. Id. at 270. 
56. Fulton Formula, reprinted in 12 McGILL L. J. 576 (1966- 67)(The November 6, 1961 
Draft Amendment formally named An Act to Provide for the Amendment in Canada of the 
Constitution of Canada). Named for the leadership provided by the then Federal Minister of 
Justice, Edmund D. Fulton. 
57. See LASKIN's, supra note 33, at 74. 
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amend any part of the constitution without the unanimous consent of 
the provinces as a temporary step toward patriation. Saskatchewan 
and Quebec feared that, once this short term remedy was created, no 
effort to find a better amending formula would be made within 
Canada.58 
In 1964, a Dominion-Provincial Conference addressed the 
amending issues that had been tabled by the 1961 Conference. s9 The 
Fulton Formula was revised by an Attorney Generals Conference in 
Ottawa. The Attorney Generals unanimously recommended the new 
"Fulton-Favreau Formula"60 be passed by the Conference of Provin-
cial Prime Ministers. It was unanimously accepted and subsequently 
approved by every provincial legislature except Quebec's in 1966. 61 
Quebec opposed the proposal, perceiving it to be inflexible and fearing 
that it would prohibit future constitutional change. 62 Once again, a 
national political effort to patriate the Canadian Constitution failed. 
Five years later, in 1971, at the Victoria Conference, another pro-
posal for constitutional reform was drafted. 63 The Victoria Charter 
outlined an amending formula for Canadian patriation. 64 Once again, 
Quebec could not support the proposal because, among other things, 
the proposal did not change the distribution of powers in relation to 
the Social Security system. 6s 
In 1978, the Constitutional Amendment Bill, or Bill C-60, was 
introduced in the Canadian Parliament by the Trudeau government. 66 
It was a unilateral attempt to reform aspects of the constitution over 
58. See B.L. Strager, Sakastchewan and the Amendment of the Canadian Constitution, 12 
McGILL L.J. 443, 462 {1966 - 67). 
59. See PETER w. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 54 (2d ed. 1985) [herein-
after HOGG]. 
60. Fulton-Favreau Formula, reprinted in 12 McGILL L.J. 579 (1966 - 67)(The October 
30, 1964 Draft Amendment formally named An Act to Provide for the Amendment in Canada 
of the Constitution of Canada). Named after the Federal Ministers of Justice principally in-
volved at the conferences in 1961, Edmund D. Fulton, and in 1964, Guy Favreau. See Bora 
Laskin, Amendment of the Constitution: Applying the Fulton-Favreau Formula, 11 McGILL 
L.J. 2 (1965). 
61. See LASKIN's supra note 33, at 75. 
62. See GUY FAVREAU, THE AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA (1965) 
[hereinafter White Paper]. This document was presented as a "White Paper" at the 1964 
Dominion-Provincial Conference on the amending problem. 
63. See LASKIN'S, supra note 33, at 75. 
64. Id. The procedure "required the consent of 1) Parliament, 2) any province which at 
any time contained more than twenty five percent of the Nation's population, 3) two Atlantic 
provinces and 4) two Western Provinces comprising at least fifty percent of the region's popu-
lation." Id. 
65. See DONALD v. SMILEY, CANADA IN QUESTION: FEDERALISM IN THE SEVENTIES 
41 - 54 (1972). 
66. See LASKIN'S, supra note 33, at 75. 
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which the Federal Parliament had exclusive control. 67 The Trudeau 
government indicated its desire to take the first step towards bringing 
the Canadian Constitution under the control of the Canadian govern-
ment by calling for consultation with provinces in a First Ministers' 
Conference. 68 However, this movement ended and the amending 
problem was left unsolved as a result of provincial opposition and a 
change in control of the federal government following the 1979 
elections. 69 
C. The Rise of Quebec's Move for Independence 
The aforementioned proposals for a procedure to amend the Ca-
nadian Constitution without British Parliamentary approval had not 
been acceptable to Quebec. In fact, beginning in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, a movement in Quebec referred to as the "Quiet Revolu-
tion"70 increased the ethnic consciousness of that French-speaking 
province. One consequence was that the requirements that any pro-
posed constitutional change would have to satisfy before Quebec 
would agree to them were considerably broadened. The question of 
an acceptable amending procedure to accomplish patriation became 
only one of the demands Quebec made before it would take part in 
any future changes to Canada's Constitution. 
The Quiet Revolution was the beginning of the development of 
Quebec's independent identity, separate and distinct from Canada. 
This social and cultural transformation saw a decline in the role of the 
church and a migration of youth from the rural areas to urban cities. 
It resulted in changes in education, provincialization of business and 
market nationalism.71 The goal was for Quebec to have greater con-
trol over its own affairs,72 to become Maitres Chez Nous. 13 From 
1960-66, Quebec built an infrastructure modeled after a modem capi-
talist society.74 These changes were the catalyst to a political move-
67. See BNA Act, supra note 4, § 91(1). 
68. See generally PIERRE E. TRUDEAU, A TIME FOR ACTION: Tow ARD THE RENEW AL 
OF THE CANADIAN FEDERATION (1978). 
69. See LASKIN's, supra note 33, at 75. 
70. Canada Survey: From New France to New Quebec, THE EcoNOMIST, June 29, 1991, 
at 7. 
71. Id. at 7 - 8. 
72. See WILLIAM D. CoLEMAN, THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT IN QUEBEC 1945 -
1980, 222 (1984). 
73. This phrase reflects the sentiment of wanting to be "Masters in our House." See 
HENRY MILNER & SHEILAGH H. MILNER, THE DECOLONIZATION OF QUEBEC AN ANALYSIS 
OF LEFT-WING NATIONALISM 168 (1973). 
74. Id. at 167. The provincial government began to regulate the economy and established 
many state enterprises most notably Hydro-Quebec, a regional electric production facility. Id. 
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ment that called for political change within Quebec. 
As a result, political parties that emerged in the 1960s advocated 
independence and chose a course of radical change for Quebec. 
Among others, The Front de liberation du Quebec (F.L. Q.) and the 
Rassemblement pour l'independance nationale (R.LN.) mobilized 
their efforts for a completely independent Quebec. 75 They envisioned 
Quebec as a completely sovereign nation with its own constitution. 76 
In 1968, another party calling for Quebec's independence was 
formed by Rene Levesque. The Parti Quebecois (P. Q.) became the 
organization which gained popular support. 77 Levesque's party was 
much less radical than the F.L.Q. and the R.LN. It sought to obtain 
Quebec's independence through legitimate political channels. Its idea 
of independence recognized that there would be some form of eco-
nomic association with Canada, but little else would exist between the 
two sovereigns. 78 In the aftermath of the "October Crisis"79 and the 
reaction of the federal government, the P. Q. emerged as the lone party 
with a viable nationalist platform "committed to change within the 
system. "80 
The P.Q. 's promise of independence won it the Quebec Provin-
cial Parliamentary elections in 1976. 81 The move for independence 
under the guidance of the P. Q. culminated in a provincial referendum 
which asked the citizens of Quebec to decide its future relationship 
with Canada. In its final form, the "sovereignty-association" referen-
dum, if passed would have authorized the Quebec government to be-
gin negotiations with the Canadian federal government on the issue of 
independence. 
In May 1980, the referendum failed by a 3:2 margin.82 A deci-
sive factor in the result was then Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Tru-
deau's promise of "renewed federalism" for all of Canada if the 
referendum was defeated. 83 Trudeau, a french Canadian, was op-




79. As part of their push for change, F.L.Q. members kidnapped two government officials 
and eventually killed one. The federal government responded by implementing martial law. 
See RICHARD HANDLER, NATIONALISM AND THE POLITICS OF CULTURE IN QUEBEC 9 
(1988). 
80. Id. (citing RICHARD BASHAM, CRISIS IN BLANC AND WHITE 197 (1978)). 
81. Id. at 9 - 10. 
82. The referendum was defeated 60% to 40%. See ACCORD, supra note 1, at 2. 
83. See PIERRE FOURNIER, A MEECH LAKE POST MORTEM: Is QUEBEC SoVEREIGNTY 
INEVITABLE? 4 (S. Fischman trans. 1991 ). In a speech four days prior to the referendum, 
Pierre Trudeau, the Prime Minister at the time, made a promise to renew Canadian federalism 
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posed to Quebec's independence and dedicated his political efforts to-
wards establishing a Canadian federation that included Quebec. 
Trudeau used Quebec's referendum for provincial sovereignty as a 
political device. He maintained that a "no" vote on the referendum 
was a "yes" vote for Canadian sovereignty from Britain; a green light 
to begin a new stage of constitutional development. 84 Following his 
promise and given the failure of Quebec's referendum, Trudeau began 
the next stage of constitutional development in Canada. The result 
was two amendments to the BNA Act, 1867: 1) the Canada Act, 
1982;85 and 2) the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 86 
D. The Canada Act, 1982 and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
The Canada Act, 1982 and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
were added to the body of Canadian Constitutional law in 1982. The 
outcome was, among other things, a patriated constitution and, for 
the first time, the enumeration of individual rights protected by the 
federal government. However, while these additions to the constitu-
tion were acceptable to nine of the ten provinces, one did not agree: 
Quebec. 
The sides were polarized regarding acceptable constitutional 
change after the failure of the Quebec referendum. 87 Once again, in 
October 1980, the provincial political factions were not able to agree 
on a viable solution. 88 This was followed by an announcement by the 
federal government that it would ask the British Parliament for ap-
proval of constitutional amendments without the prior consent of the 
provinces. This was a remarkable event as it was contrary to estab-
lished constitutional conventions. 89 
if the referendum was defeated. This contemplated patriation, a Charter of Rights and a thrust 
towards centralizing governmental powers. Id. 
84. See generally Robert W. Kerr, Constitution Act, 1980: Is It Constitutional?, 30 U. 
NEW BRUNSWICK L.J. 73 (1981). 
85. Canada Act, R.S.C., Appendices (No. 44)(1985)(Can.). 
86. Constitution Act, 1982, pt. 1 (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), reprinted 
in Canada, in 3 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & 
Gisbert H. Flanz eds. 1983). 
87. See generally Thomas Berger, The Charter: A Historical Perspective, 23 U. BRIT. 
CoLUM. L. REV. 603 (1989). The camps were drawn between those who supported the notion 
of a strong federal government and those who felt the provinces should properly maintain 
greater political power. Additionally, regional differences based on economic interest and cul-
tural distinctiveness, especially language, divided the conference. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. See W.H. McConnell, Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Amending Process in Canada, 
44 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS. 195, 220 (1981); LASKIN'S, supra note 33, at 75 - 76. The term 
"constitutional convention" was first used by Dicey in his LA w OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1885). These rules developed through custom and precedent in British government and were 
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Canada's ability to amend its constitution prior to the 1982 
amendments was guided by a mixture of written rules and constitu-
tional conventions. 90 From 1867 to the present, no one single docu-
ment has existed entitled "The Constitution of Canada."91 What is 
referred to as the Canadian Constitution is a body of law composed of 
written and common law rules, as well as constitutional conventions. 
These conventions have evolved out of practice and custom in Cana-
dian government and are therefore usually unwritten. Constitutional 
conventions serve the vital function of ensuring that the framework of 
the constitution correlates with contemporary constitutional values of 
a given period.92 
Four principal constitutional conventions have emerged in Can-
ada: (1) the U.K. Parliament would only take amending action upon 
formal Canadian request; (2) the Canadian Parliament had to act in 
making the request by joint address of the House and Senate; (3) no 
amendment would be made at the request of a province; and (4) the 
Canadian Parliament would not request an amendment directly af-
fecting federal-provincial relations without prior consultation and 
agreement with the provinces. 93 Therefore, Trudeau's decision to go 
to the British Parliament with proposed amendments without first 
consulting the provincial governments directly conflicted with the 
fourth constitutional convention enumerated above. 
Notwithstanding the conventions, the Trudeau-led federal gov-
ernment introduced a resolution in the Canadian Parliament. The 
resolution asked the U.K. Parliament to approve an act that would 
entrench a modified version of the Victoria Charter's amending 
formula94 in the Canadian Constitution, thereby finally patriating 
Canada's Constitution. 9s 
This resolution was delayed by opposition in the Canadian Par-
liament and by eight provinces that disagreed with the bill. 96 The 
federal government also stalled the bill's passage to allow the Supreme 
Court of Canada time to rule on the constitutionality of its actions. 97 
incorporated into the governments of the British colonies, i.e., Canada. See also W.S. Holds-
worth, The Conventions of the Eighteenth Century Constitution, 17 IOWA L. REV. 161 (1932). 
90. See LASKIN's, supra note 33, at 72 - 73. 
91. Id. at 72. 
92. See Hogg, supra note 59, at 19 - 20. 
93. See White Paper, supra note 62. 
94. See COLEMAN, supra note 72. 
95. See LASKIN's, supra note 33, at 75. 
96. Only Ontario and New Brunswick supported the federal resolution. Id. 
97. Id. at 76. 
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In the Patriation Case, 98 the Supreme Court decided that it would be 
"unconstitutional in a conventional sense" for the federal government 
to lay this bill before the British Parliament without first having pro-
vincial agreement. 99 Accordingly, Trudeau had to have the support 
of the provinces for his patriation proposal. 100 
Following the Supreme Court's ruling, the "Gang of Eight"101 
provinces that joined political forces to oppose the federal initiative 
led a national debate over the manner in which constitutional change 
should take place. The result was another First Ministers' Meeting in 
November 1981.102 After months of deliberation, a deal was struck to 
which only the government of Quebec objected.103 
The result was the Canada Act, 1982 which encompassed two 
major amendments to the BNA Act, 1867 as well as renaming it the 
Constitution Act, 1867 .104 First, it transferred the power to amend 
the Canadian Constitution from the British Parliament to the Cana-
dian Parliament. 10s This achieved the patriation of the Canadian 
Constitution. Secondly, it added a Charter of Rights and Freedoms106 
to the Constitution which established, for the first time, constitutional 
protection of individual rights from governmental encroachment. 
The protection encompassed, among other things, freedom of expres-
sion, 107 equality, 108 language, 109 mobility, 110 association, 111 religion 112 
and the press and other media of communication. 113 
98. Reference Re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (Nos. 1, 2 & 3), 125 D.L.R. 
3d 1 (1982)(Can.). 
99. Id. at 107. However, the Court made it explicitly clear that they were not ruling on 
the exact provincial agreement needed to put the constitutional stamp on federal action. Id. at 
103. 
100. See Gil Remillard, The Constitution Act, 1982: An Unfinished Compromise, 32 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 269, 270 (1984) [hereinafter Unfinished Compromise]. 
101. The provinces opposing the federal action were: Alberta, British Columbia, Sas-
katchewan, Manitoba, Quebec, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island. See 
LASKIN's, supra note 33, at 75 - 76. 
102. Id. at 76. See discussion supra part H.B. 
103. Id. Its objection resulted in the Meech Lake Accord discussed infra text part III. 
104. Section 1 of the BNA Act, 1867 was repealed and was substituted by: "This Act 
may be cited as the Constitution Act, 1867." See BNA Act, 1867, supra note 4, § 1. 
105. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 86, pt. V (Procedure for Amending Constitution 
of Canada), §§ 38 - 49. 
106. Id. pt. 1 (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), §§ 1 - 34. 
107. Id. § 2(b). 
108. Id. § 15. 
109. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 86, § 16. 
110. Id. § 6. 
111. Id. § 2(d). 
112. Id. § 2(a). 
113. Constitutic;m Act, 1982, supra note 86, § 2(b). 
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Both Houses of the Canadian Parliament passed the resolution in 
December 1981, thereby putting the proposal before the provincial 
governments. The proposed amending procedure in the Canada Act, 
1982 was completely unacceptable to Quebec in its proposed form and 
was voted down by its parliament. 114 Rene Levesque, Quebec's Prime 
Minister, refused to sign it as proposed. 11s The formula provided that 
the Constitution Act, 1867 could be amended with the consent of the 
federal government and at least two-thirds of the provinces (seven of 
the ten) whose aggregate population amounted to fifty percent of Can-
ada's total population. 116 However, it also provided that a province 
could "opt out" of an amendment which affected the province's legis-
lative authority. 117 In such cases where an amendment pertained to 
education or culture, the federal government would provide reason-
able compensation to the province that opted out. 118 Quebec, how-
ever, desired compensation for every amendment from which it opted 
out and therefore was dissatisfied with the proposed amendment. 
Additionally, the Canada Act, 1982 enumerated a list of areas 
that were subject to the general amending procedure, but did not pro-
vide the right to opt out. 119 This section related to the following mat-
ters: "the principle of proportionate representation of the provinces in 
the House of Commons," 120 the powers of and the selection of the 
Senate, 121 the number of members a province is entitled to have repre-
sent it in the Senate, 122 the composition of the Supreme Court of Can-
ada, 123 "the extension of existing provinces into the territories"124 and 
"the establishment of new provinces."12s Quebec objected to not hav-
ing a veto over any amendments affecting these areas. It maintained 
that changes to these, the most fundamental aspects of Canadian fed-
eralism, should not be made without the consent of all the provinces 
114. See Unfinished Compromise, supra note 100, at 269. Hon. Gil Remillard, the Minis-
ter of Justice in Quebec, said the compromise was unacceptable because it was incomplete. 
115. See MAJORIE M. BoWKER, THE MEECH LAKE ACCORD WHAT IT WILL MEAN TO 
You AND CANADA: AN INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS 10 (1990). 
116. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 86, pt. V (Procedure for Amending Constitution 
of Canada), § 38(1). This is commonly referred to as the "seven-fifty formula." 
117. Id. § 38(3). 
118. Id. § 40. 
119. Id. § 42(1). 
120. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 86, § 42(1)(a). 
121. Id. § 42(1)(b). 
122. Id. § 42(1)(c). 
123. Id. § 42(1)(d). 
124. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 86, § 42(1)(e). 
125. Id. § 42(1)(f). 
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as the new amending formula would allow .126 Nine other provinces, 
however, accepted the proposal and the new constitutional amend-
ments were formally incorporated into Canadian constitutional law 
when the Canada Act, 1982, 127 including the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, was presented to and approved by the British Parliament 
and received Royal assent on April 17, 1982.128 Thus, a new amend-
ing procedure was introduced into the Canadian Constitution without 
Quebec's consent, thereby ending the U.K.'s colonial involvement in 
Canada. 129 
The underlying problem with the implementation of this consti-
tutional framework was that it was not accepted by all the provinces. 
This flaw conflicts with the fundamental concept of the legitimacy of 
constitutional law. 13° Constitutional law must be both socially and 
politically legitimate. The fact that a majority of provinces accepted 
this amending procedure makes it legal, but not legitimate. 131 Thus, 
the job of final patriation will not be completed until a constitutional 
framework acceptable to all the provinces is created. The Meech 
Lake Accord was drafted to create a federal order under which all the 
provinces could agree. However, just like many of the previous pro-
posals, it failed to be ratified by all the provinces. 
III. THE MEECH LAKE ACCORD: THE LATEST STAGE OF 
CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
Canada's constitutional development began its latest chapter on 
April 30, 1987, when a First Ministers' Meeting ended at Meech 
Lake, Quebec. 132 Canada's current Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney, 
moved to try to address the needs of French-speaking Quebec and 
have those needs included in the Constitution Act, 1867. The confer-
ence produced the Meech Lake Accord, 133 signed by all the provincial 
and the federal leaders. 134 Quebec agreed to sign the Constitution Act 
126. See Unfinished Compromise, supra note 100, at 277 - 78. 
127. Canada Act, R.S.C., Appendices (No. 44)(1985XCan.). 
128. Id. 
129. See Ray Romanow, "Reworking the Miracle'~· The Constitutional Accord 1981, 8 
QUEEN'S L.J. 74 (1982). 
130. See Richard S. Kay, The Creation of Constitutions in Canada and the United States, 
7 CAN. U.S. L.J. 111, 120 - 23 (1984). 
131. Id. Quebec never formally passed the resolution to adopt the Constitution Act, 
1982. 
132. See ACCORD, supra note l, at preface. The actual text of the Meech Lake Accord 
was drafted on June 3, 1987 at a second meeting in Ottawa. Id. 
133. For full text with annotations see ACCORD, supra note 1. 
134. See FIRST MINISTERS' MEETING ON THE CONSTITUTION, APR. 30, 1987, reprinted 
in 17 MANITOBA L.J. 107 (1987). The goal, as stated in the Draft Statement of Principles, was 
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in exchange for the incorporation of the Accord into the 
constitution. 13s 
Quebec's Minister of Justice, Gil Remillard, was given authority 
to inform the provinces and the federal government of the prerequi-
sites necessary for Quebec's support of the 1982 amendments to the 
Constitution Act, 1867. In May 1986, he outlined five conditions: 1) 
explicit recognition of Quebec as a distinct society; 2) a guarantee of 
increased powers in immigration matters; 3) limitation of federal 
spending power; 4) recognition of a right to veto proposed amend-
ments; and 5) Quebec's participation in the appointment of judges to 
the Supreme Court of Canada.136 
A. The Accord's Impact on Canada's Existing Constitutional Order 
The amendments to the Constitution Act, 1867 contained in the 
Accord specifically addressed Quebec's demands. Additionally, the 
seventeen sections included in the Accord made several other changes 
to the existing constitutional framework. First and foremost, it would 
have granted the francophone province special status as a "distinct 
society."137 Clause 1 of the Accord would have added a new section 2 
to the Constitution Act, 1867 which would have provided: 
The Constitution of Canada shall be interpreted in a manner consis-
tent with (a) the recognition that the existence of French-speaking 
Canadians, centered in Quebec but also present elsewhere in Canada, 
and English-speaking Canadians, concentrated outside Quebec but 
also present in Quebec, constitutes a fundamental characteristic of 
Canada; and (b) the recognition that Quebec constitutes within Can-
ada a distinct society. 13s 
This provision adds that the "role of the Parliament of Canada and 
the provincial legislatures to preserve the fundamental characteristic 
of Canada referred to [above] is affirmed."139 Significantly, the next 
paragraph explicitly affirms that it is the role of the legislature and 
Government of Quebec to "preserve and promote the distinct 
to transform the Meech Lake Accord into the 1987 Constitutional Accord, an amendment to 
the Constitution Act, 1867. Id. 
135. See Gil Remillard, Quebec's Quest for Survival and Equality Via the Meech Lake 
Accord, in THE MEECH LAKE PRIMER: CONFLICTING VIEWS OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL 
ACCORD 28 (Michael D. Behiels ed. 1989) [hereinafter MEECH LAKE PRIMER]. 
136. Id. at 29. 
137. See ACCORD, supra note 1, cl. 1, at 11 (proposed new§ 2 to the Constitution Act, 
1867). 
138. See id. 
139. Id. cl. 1, para. 2. 
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identity." 140 
The "distinct society" clause gives something to Quebec that is 
not given to any other province. It has the ability to "preserve and 
promote" while the other provinces can only "preserve.'' Questions 
have been raised about the meaning of this clause and its significance 
in light of the unique powers Quebec possessed under the pre-existing 
constitutional order. 141 One constitutional scholar, Professor Peter 
W. Hogg, believes that while it could be argued that this is a new 
grant of power, the better view is that this section merely recognizes 
existing powers. 142 He adds, however, that although this clause may 
only be symbolic, the Accord contains several other sections that give 
"concrete expression" to the notion of a distinct society. 143 
The sections concerning immigration, 144 Senate reform, 14s fed-
eral spending146 and Canadian Supreme Court appointments147 illus-
trate the power Quebec would have had to promote its distinctness 
under the Accord. The Accord would have added five sections cover-
ing immigration to the Constitution Act, 1867 .148 The new scheme 
would have obligated the Canadian federal government to negotiate 
an agreement relating to immigration with any province making a re-
quest.149 Such agreement would gain constitutional status when exe-
cuted in accordance with the paragraphs of this section.1so The end 
result would have guaranteed Quebec the ability to participate in the 
selection of individuals taking up permanent or temporary residence 
within its territory. 
In addition to immigration, the Accord would have "constitu-
tionalized" Quebec's representation on the Supreme Court of Can-
ada.1s 1 The BNA Act, 1867 did not provide a court of last appeal in 
Canada, rather the right of appeal was to the British Privy Council. 
The Supreme Court now in existence was established by federal stat-
ute in 1875.1s2 The new sections in the Accord would have explicitly 
140. Id. cl. 1, para. 2(3) (emphasis added). 
141. See ACCORD, supra note 1, at 12 - 13. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 21. 
145. ACCORD, supra note 1, at 15. 
146. Id. at 35. 
147. See id. els. 4 & 5, at 27 (proposed new sub-headings and sections to Constitution 
Act, 1987, §§ 101A - 101E). 
148. See Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 104, § 95. 
149. See ACCORD, supra note 1, cl. 3 at 21 (new § 95A). 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 32. 
152. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. ch. S - 19 (Canada 1970). 
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placed the Supreme Court in the constitution of Canada for the first 
time.m 
These sections would have also established the criteria for the 
appointment of Supreme Court judges. Significantly for Quebec, one 
paragraph specifically provided that "[a]t least three judges of the 
Supreme Court of Canada shall be appointed from among persons 
who, after having been admitted to the bar of Quebec, have, for a total 
of ten years, been judges of any court of Quebec or of any court estab-
lished by the Parliament of Canada, or members of the bar of Que-
bec." 1s4 The appointments under this section could have only been 
made from names of persons submitted by the Government of 
Quebec.1ss 
The Accord also reformed the Senate which was one of Quebec's 
demands1s6 for joining the Constitution Act, 1867. Appointments to 
the Senate were, and still are today, made solely on the advice of the 
federal cabinet by the Governor General.1s7 The Accord would have 
limited appointments to individuals whose names had been submitted 
by the province from which the Senate vacancy was created.iss The 
effect of this would have been to transfer the power to choose repre-
sentation in Ottawa from the federal level to the provincial level, 
thereby achieving more effective representation. 
Similarly, Quebec's demand for limitation on federal spending 
was addressed by the Accord. Section 7 provided: 
The Government of Canada shall provide reasonable compensation 
to the government of a province that chooses not to participate in a 
national shared-cost program that is established by the Government 
of Canada after the coming into force of this section in an area of 
exclusive provincial jurisdiction, if the province carries on a program 
or initiative that is compatible with the national objectives. 1s9 
This section would have allowed provinces to opt out of national 
shared-cost programs established by the federal government. It 
would have changed the existing scheme by providing "reasonable 
compensation" to any province that did not take part in such a pro-
gram, but developed its own initiative "compatible with the national 
153. See ACCORD, supra note 1, at 31. 
154. Id. at 27 (new § 101B(2)). 
155. Id. at 28 (new § 101C(3)). 
156. See Quebec's demands discussed supra text part II. 
157. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 104, § 24. 
158. ACCORD, supra note 1, cl. 2 (new § 25). 
159. Id. at 37, cl. 7. (new § 106A(l)). 
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objectives." 160 
One of the most significant changes the Accord would have made 
to satisfy Quebec was the procedure to amend the constitution. As 
previously discussed, 161 this issue had been one of the most controver-
sial aspects of constitutional change in Canada throughout the twenti-
eth century, and was one of the reasons Quebec did not sign the 
Canada Act, 1982.162 
The Constitution Act, 1867 provides the existing procedure for 
amending the constitution. Currently, a province can opt out of a 
constitutional amendment and receive reasonable compensation when 
the change deals with education or other cultural matters. 163 The Ac-
cord would have expanded this right to any amendment from which a 
province opted out. 
Additionally, under the existing amending scheme, changes af-
fecting the Senate, the House of Commons, the Supreme Court and 
the extension and creation of new provinces were subject to the 
"seven-fifty formula." 164 The proposed changes in the Accord would 
have required changes to these categories to receive provincial una-
nimity. Thus, Quebec, as well as any other province, would have had 
a veto over changes to these fundamental areas of the federation. 
Along with a provision calling for an annual constitutional con-
ference of First Ministers, 165 these were the changes proposed by the 
Accord that were to satisfy Quebec and encourage it to sign the Con-
stitution Act, 1867. In accordance with the Constitution Act, 1867 
amending procedure, the Accord had to be ratified by all ten provin-
cial legislatures within three years to become part of the Canadian 
Constitution. 166 The Accord became the center of national debate 
during this time period, but ultimately failed to become law due to 
lack of provincial approval on June 23, 1990. 
B. The Accord's Ratification Process 
The Accord was sent to the legislatures of every province for ap-
proval of the amendment in hopes of firmly placing it into Canadian 
constitutional law. The process of provincial acceptance was long and 
drawn out. The Accord itself was criticized by politicians, constitu-
160. Id. 
161. See discussion supra text part 11.B. 
162. See discussion supra text part 11.D. 
163. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 104, § 40. 
164. See supra note 116. 
165. ACCORD, supra note 1, cl. 8 (new§ 50). 
166. See Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 104, §§ 39(2), 41. 
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tional experts, academics and citizens. 167 Some provinces felt that the 
Accord ceded too many powers to the provinces,168 while others, es-
pecially Quebec, faulted it for not giving enough powers to the provin-
cial governments. Women's groups denounced it for not reaffirming 
principles of sexual equality. 169 Finally, because it was drafted by a 
small group of leaders without effective open public debate, scholars 
criticized its lack of democratic process. 170 
On June 23, 1987, Quebec's legislative assembly approved the 
Accord as did the Saskatchewan assembly three months later. 171 
While other provinces debated, it seemed certain that final legitimate 
patriation, which would include Quebec, was inevitable. Nonetheless, 
as the June 23, 1990, deadline drew near, the future of the Accord 
became less certain. The Canadian political agenda was almost exclu-
sively devoted to the constitutional problem. In Newfoundland, Man-
itoba and New Brunswick, the legislatures decided they would not 
sign the Accord unless certain modifications were introduced. 172 On 
June 3, 1990, Prime Minister Mulroney called all the provincial Prime 
Ministers to Ottawa for negotiations. In trying to resolve the con-
cerns of the provinces, Mulroney placed considerable pressure on the 
undecided provincial leaders to ratify the Accord. 
The Federal government, sensing that the provinces would not 
ratify in time for the deadline, announced they would apply to the 
Canadian Supreme Court for a time extension. The Prime Minister of 
Newfoundland described this as the "final manipulation" and ad-
journed the Newfoundland House of Assembly without a vote on the 
Accord.173 On the eve of June 23, 1990, adoption was formally 
blocked in the Province of Manitoba. 174 The end result was the col-
167. See generally MEECH LAKE PRIMER, supra note 135; Bryan Schwartz, Fathoming 
Meech Lake, 17 MANITOBA L.J. 1 (1987). 
168. See Gerard Beaudoin, Constitutionalizing Quebec's Protection at the Supreme Court 
and in the Senate, in MEECH LAKE PRIMER, supra note 135, at 385. The proponents of this 
argument complained that the Accord would provincialize federal institutions. For example, 
the Supreme Court of Canada would be influenced because the Accord gave Quebec the right 
to have three of the judges appointed from their province. See ACCORD, supra note 1, at 27 -
28, § 101(bX2); discussion supra text part III.A. 
169. See Mary Eberts, The Constitution, The Charter and the Distinct Society Clause: 
Why are Women Being Ignored?, in MEECH LAKE PRIMER, supra note 135, at 302. 
170. See Bryan Schwartz, Refashioning Meech Lake, 18 MANITOBA L.J. 19, 20 (1989). 
See also Alan C. Cairns, Citizens and Their Charter: Democratizing the Process of Constitu-
tional Reform, in MEECH LAKE PRIMER, supra note 135, at 109. 
171. See ACCORD, supra note 1, at 1. 
172. See THE EcoNOMIST, July 18, 1990 (Country Report). 
173. See John F. Bums, Canadian Leader Appeals For Calm On Quebec Dispute, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 24, 1990, § 1, at 1. 
174. See Mary Walsh, Elijah Harper Stands Out As A Chief Among Canada's Indians, 
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lapse of the Accord. Thus, Canada is left without a constitution in-
corporating all of the provinces under one unified constitutional 
framework. 
C. Canada's Constitutional Development After the Failure of the 
Meech Lake Accord 
The Premier of Quebec, the leader of Quebec's Liberal Party, 
Robert Bourassa, announced, on the day following the collapse of the 
Accord, that Quebec would carry on as a "distinct society," capable 
of assuming its own development. 11s He added that his government 
would not . take part in any more multilateral talks, only bilateral ne-
gotiations with the Federal government. Bourassa and Jacques 
Parizeau, leader of the P. Q., have taken action by initiating a law that 
established a commission to determine the future of Quebec. 176 The 
Quebec Commission,177 also known as the Belanger-Campeau Com-
mission, 178 is comprised of thirty-six leaders from different sectors of 
Quebec. 179 The Quebec Commission is dominated by economists, but 
has given priority to cultural, political and strategic considerations. 180 
Analysts following the activities of the Quebec Commission feel that 
it is trying to answer two questions. 181 First, what powers are re-
quired for Quebec to preserve and promote its distinctiveness?182 Sec-
ond, what process should be established in order to attain those 
powers?183 
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1990, part H, at 2. In the Manitoba legislature, Elijah Harper, the only 
native Indian in Manitoba's Assembly, successfully blocked the passage of the Accord. By 
using political knowledge and strategy he accomplished what no one in Canada thought was 
possible. He said "no" to Prime Minister Mulroney and the constitutional Accord. His feat 
sparked a feeling of pride in the Indian population of Canada which began a chain reaction of 
political unrest throughout the nation's Indian territories. The thrust of their objection was 
based on the fact that they had been left out of the constitutional amendment process. Id. 
175. See John F. Bums, Canadian Leader Appeals for Calm on Quebec Dispute, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 24, 1990, § 1, at 1. 
176. See Laforest, supra note 9. 
177. Id. at 106. 
178. Named after the co-chairpersons who lead the Commission, Jean Campeau and 
Michel Belanger. Id. at 104. 
179. Shortly after the collapse of the Accord, the Premier of Quebec, Robert Bourassa, 
formed a committee on the future of Quebec. The job, given to economists and business lead-
ers, is to recommend a plan for the future direction of the province. Many have speculated 
that this could be a proposal to move for sovereignty as an independent nation distinct from 
Canada. See Frank Perrotta, Two Businessman on Quebec Panel, BoSTON GLOBE, Aug. 26, 
1990, at AS. 
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The Quebec Commission reported its findings to Quebec's Parlia-
ment in March 1991 and recommended that it pass a law requiring a 
provincial referendum on sovereignty.184 The provincial government 
introduced legislation that would call for a vote on Quebec's future no 
later than October 1992.18' It also proposed that, during this interim 
period, proposals from the rest of Canada should be reviewed to de-
cide what should be on the ballot when Quebec's citizens decide their 
future constitutional order.186 
Separatist sentiments in Quebec are at an all-time high after the 
other provinces rejected the Accord and Quebec. 187 Based on action 
taken by the Quebec government, some critics feel that the federal 
structure that has existed in Canada from 1867 through 1982 is now 
"dead."188 Disenchantment with the pre-existing federal system is 
giving way to a distinct Quebec nationalism. Meanwhile, the other 
provinces are also calling for changes in Canada's federal order. 189 
Western provinces, sensing the federal government's favoritism to-
wards Quebec, are also calling for changes in the federal arrange-
ment.190 Aboriginal groups, 191 as well as the Territories, are pushing 
for greater representation in any process that leads to the creation of a 
new Canadian structure.192 
Similarly, dissatisfaction with existing constitutional organiza-
tions is also occurring in the former Soviet Union, India, Yugoslavia, 
and Czechoslovakia.193 This trend, which has been referred to as "re-
184. See Quebec Government Introduces Referendum Bill, REUTERS REP., May IS, 1991, 
(Money Report). 
185. Id. 
186. Id. See also Peter M. Leslie, Options for the Future of Canada: the Good, Bad and 
the Fantastic, in OPTIONS, supra note 1, at 123. The author undertakes a general discussion of 
the spectrum of options that may come before the Commission. 
187. See, e.g., PIERRE BoURGAULT, Now OR NEVER! MANIFESTO FOR AN INDEPEND-
ENT QUEBEC (David Homel trans. 1991 ). Pierre Bourgault, a long time advocate of Quebec 
sovereignty, outlines his vision for an independent Quebec. 
188. See Laforest, supra note 9, at 103. 
189. See A Survey of Canada, THE EcONOMIST, June 29, 1991, at 4, 14. 
190. See William Clairbome, Canada's Western Provinces Want More Independence,· Fail-
ure Of Meech Lake Accord Set Stage For Provincial Leaders' Call For Increase In Regionalism, 
WASH. POST, July 28, 1990, § 1, at A12. The provincial leaders of British Columbia, Mani-
toba, Alberta and Saskatchewan seek a "blueprint for the new realities of the 1990s." Id. In 
response to a perceived federal bias, they are proposing to collect their taxes regionally. This 
would give them greater control over public spending and increase their autonomy from Ot-
tawa. Id. 
191. See David C. Hawkes & Bradford W. Morse, Alternative Methods for Aboriginal 
Participation in Processes of Constitutional Reform, in OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 163. 
192. Id. 
193. See Small Wonder Foreigners Fear for Canada It'll Take More than Derek Burney's 
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gional self-determination,"194 reflects the reality that individuals do 
not easily renounce their national identities, and will resist attempts to 
homogenize their communities into large collective or federal bod-
ies.19s However, while federal unions are breaking down throughout 
the world, in Europe, national distinctiveness has been reconciled 
with universalism. 196 The politically, socially, and culturally diverse 
member states of the European Union have joined together under one 
common legal order. This supposed pre-federal system has been de-
veloping and integrating slowly since the Treaty of Paris was signed in 
1951. The experience of the European Union member states offers 
Canada a possible model to solve its constitutional crisis. 
IV. THE EUROPEAN UNION: A POSSIBLE MODEL FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
The way in which the diverse nations of the European Union 
came together and agreed on a legal framework has broad implica-
tions for a method of constitutional change. Born out of economic 
need, it has developed slowly over time, enlarging and integrating its 
laws and institutions. It is not a uniform legal structure, rather it is 
comprised of three separate elements. First, the member states eco-
nomic policies are bound under the treaties of the EC. Second, sepa-
rate from the framework of the EC and its institutions, the member 
states cooperate at an inter-governmental level in the areas of foreign 
policy and security. Finally, the member states also have undertaken 
inter-governmental cooperation in police matters. The result is not a 
strict federal constitutional structure but in many ways the members 
states have become a constitutionally organized entity that was not 
established by one all-encompassing document. 
The present status of the European Union's fundamental institu-
tions, its structural organization and distribution of political and legal 
pewer are unique to the experience of its member states. While it is 
instructive for Canada to examine the European Union as it exists 
today, to make a useful comparison, the origins and evolution of the 
European Union must also be analyzed. 
Bravado to Convince World We're not Just Another Fragmenting Federation, TORONTO STAR, 
July 13, 1991, (Insight) at 04. 
194. See supra note 14. 
195. See Laforest, supra note 9, at 112 (citing K. Minogue & B. Williams, Ethnic Conflict 
in the Soviet Union: the Revenge of Particularism, in A. MOTYL BUILDING BRIDGES: SOVIET 
NATIONALITIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1990)). 
196. Id. at 113. 
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A. Historical Background of the European Union and the EC's 
Fundamental Principles 
Political events in the late 1940s increased the likelihood of a 
third war between Eastern and W estem powers. The collapse of the 
Moscow Conference in 194 7 concerning the future of Germany, the 
Prague Coup in 1948 and the Berlin Blockade in 1948 all combined to 
raise tensions. A call for immediate action to resolve the growing 
political tension between the East and West was rendered obsolete 
when the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb in 1949.197 
At the center of this post-World War II crisis was the status of 
Federal Germany. The traditional rivalry between France and Ger-
many and the threat of future confrontation had to be reconciled. To 
ensure that Germany would not have the ability to re-militarize, the 
economic factors of a war machine, steel and coal, had to be dealt 
with. The United States had developed the Marshall Plan to return 
economic health to the war-tom "olde world" economy. 198 Addition-
ally, the formation of the Organization of European Economic Coop-
eration (O.E.E.C.) made some type of an agreement between France 
and Germany, as well as the other European states inevitable. 
In 1950, the Foreign Minister of France, Robert Schuman, de-
vised a plan to integrate Germany and other western European states 
into one economic federation. This plan was revolutionary in that it 
did not seek to merely maintain an equilibrium of interests, but to 
"fus[ e] the interests of the European peoples . . . . " 199 The Schuman 
Plan sought to achieve this goal and maintain peace through four fun-
damental principles which continue to guide the EC today. 
First, Schuman proposed an order where the common institu-
tions were superior to those of the individual member states. 200 Rec-
ognition of this principle would ensure that democratic and peaceful 
relations between the States would prevail. It would also replace na-
tionalistic and domineering attitudes with an era of cooperation be-
tween the States based on common interests. 
Second, the governing institutions had to have the power to exe-
cute their functions for the collective. 201 Procedures were to be estab-
lished to ensure that the individuals operating the institutions were 
197. See PASCAL FONTAINE, EUROPE - A FRESH START: THE SCHUMAN DECLARA-
TION 1950 - 90, 9 (1990) [hereinafter SCHUMAN DECLARATION]. This event marked the end 
of East-West dialogue and the beginning of the Cold War. Id. 
198. See MATHUSEN 5th, supra note 17, at 6. 
199. ScHUMAN DECLARATION, supra note 197, at 17 (quoting Jean Monnet's MEMOIRS). 
200. Id. at 19. 
201. Id. 
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not national delegates. They would have an allegiance to the new fed-
eration and act independently for the benefit of all the States. 
Cooperation between the independent institutions and member 
states was the aim of the third principle. The institutions would be 
affecting the macroeconomic policies of the member states. Because 
these are normally matters of concern for each state's government, 
they would have to allow the states to defend their national interests 
to ensure the independence of the institutions. The institution created 
would necessarily allow member states to exercise their interest in a 
limited manner. Therefore, cooperation between the governing insti-
tutions would ensure that individual member interests were recog-
nized, but that the common interest would prevail. 202 
Finally, given the principle of states' representation discussed 
above, the principle of equality among states was established. 203 This 
would eliminate discrimination and domination of larger states over 
smaller states. The progress of the new union would not be impeded 
by a requirement of unanimous consent or influenced by proportional 
representation. Thus, equality for all member states in each new insti-
tution was placed into the newly emerging European order. 
B. ECSC - The First Community 
On May 9, 1950, Robert Schuman took his plan from concept to 
reality by proposing the European Steel and Coal Community204 
(ECSC) as the "first stage of European Federation. "205 This Treaty 
became the first common legal order between the original member 
states of the EC. It called for a change in control over French and 
German coal and steel production from national authorities to a high 
authority that was only responsible to the Community. The threat of 
war would be removed through joint control over the major inputs of 
war: steel and coal. The proposed Community would adhere to the 
basic principles of the Schuman Plan. 
Germany agreed to the proposal and began negotiations with 
France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy.206 In 
202. Id. at 20 - 21. 
203. ScHUMAN DECLARATION, supra note 197, at 21 - 22. 
204. See ECSC Treaty, supra note 16. 
205. See P.S.R.F. MATHUSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 6 (4th ed. 
1985) [hereinafter MATHUSEN 4th]. 
206. The United Kingdom was asked to join in the negotiations, but the concept of a 
High Authority was viewed as inconsistent with the principle of parliamentary supremacy in 
Britain. See Peter Herzog, The European Communities: A Model for a Settlement in the Mid-
dle East?, 13 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 509, 512 (1987). 
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Paris, on April 18, 1951, the Treaty establishing the ECSC was signed 
by the six member nations (the Six).207 Approximately one year later, 
on July 25, 1952, the national parliaments of each member state rati-
fied the ECSC and placed the development of the EC in motion. 208 
The result was that all barriers to trade in coal and steel between the 
Six were abolished by 1953. 
The Treaty creating the ECSC is considered to be the first instru-
ment of European integration. 209 Its most important characteristic is 
its "supra-national" construction.210 This was not another inter-gov-
ernmental organization, but a "quasi-federation" concerning one eco-
nomic area with the signatory states retaining their sovereignty over 
everything else. 211 
Institutionally, the ECSC was comprised of a High Authority,212 
a Council of Ministers,213 an Assembly214 and a Court of Justice.21 s 
The High Authority was the executive body whose management deci-
sions concerning the steel and coal industry were binding on the 
member states. The function of the Council was to harmonize the 
national economies in the steel and coal markets.216 Limited political 
control was focused in the Assembly. The Court's role was to moni-
tor the application of the ECSC Treaty and review the High Author-
ity's decisions.217 Thus, the establishment of the ECSC was proof that 
in spite of diverse national interests a supra-national structure was a 
viable means of unifying sovereign states.218 
C. The Early Setbacks of the EC 
In response to historical events of the time, the Six endeavored to 
take steps to develop the Community. The Korean War, which had 
begun in June 1950, and the cold war tension between the West and 
the emerging Soviet Bloc had focused the attention of member states 
on the formation of a common defense community. However, by 
April 27, 1952, when the Treaty establishing the European Defense 
207. See ECSC Treaty, supra note 16. 
208. See MATHUSEN 4th, supra note 205, at 7. 
209. See LASOK, supra note 18, at 12. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. See ECSC Treaty, supra note 16, arts. 8 - 19. 
213. Id. arts. 26 - 30. 
214. Id. arts. 20 - 25. 
215. Id. arts. 31 - 45. 
216. See LASOK, supra note 18, at 13. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. at 14. 
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Community was signed, the international political scene had eased 
with the death of Stalin, only to ease further the following year with 
the end of the Korean war.219 In light of these developments any 
notion of abandoning national military forces appeared too extreme a 
measure. The Treaty was signed and ratified by five members, but 
was rejected by the French National Assembly on August 31, 1954.220 
This reluctance to transfer control to the EC dissolved any chance of 
forming a European Political Community Treaty that had not even 
been signed yet, but was proposed.221 
Despite these setbacks, integration of the member nations moved 
ahead. The future proposals were less ambitious and were not ele-
vated to the same level as the previous proposals. This is one of the 
characteristics which has led to the successful development of the EC. 
When one proposal is not acceptable to the member nations, instead 
of trying to redraft another proposal on the same scale, the group 
takes a step back and seeks a more modest approach towards 
integration. 
D. EEC and Euratom 
The next step toward integration was formally taken in 1955 
when the idea of a common market and the joint development of 
transportation and energy was submitted to the Foreign Ministers of 
the member states. 222 As a result, the Six signed the Treaty establish-
ing the European Economic Community223 (EEC) and the Treaty es-
tablishing The European Atomic Energy Community224 (Euratom) in 
219. See MATHUSEN 4th, supra note 205, at 7. 
220. See Herzog, supra note 206, at 514. See also EDWARD FURSDON, THE EUROPEAN 
DEFENSE COMMUNITY, A HISTORY 295 - 97 (1980). 
221. See Herzog, supra note 206, at 514. 
222. The general proposals were approved at a conference of Foreign Ministers in Mes-
sina, Sicily in June of 1955. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paul-Henri Spaak, was 
given the job of reporting with a feasibility study known as the "Spaak Report." At this time 
again an invitation to join the community was made to the United Kingdom, once again they 
did not accept. See H. HEISER, BRITISH POLICY WITH REGARD TO THE UNIFICATION EF-
FORTS ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT 96 (1959). See also 1 HANS SMIT & PETER HERZOG, 
THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN EcONOMIC COMMUNITY: A COMMENTARY ON THE EEC 
TREATY P5 - P6 (1990). 
223. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, done Mar. 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958) reprinted in EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES-COMMIS-
SION, TREATIES EsTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 115 (abr. ed. 1987) [hereinaf-
ter EEC Treaty]. 
224. Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, done Mar. 25, 1957, 
298 U.N.T.S. 44 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958) reprinted in EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES-
COMMISSION, TREATIES EsTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 385 (abr. ed. 1987) 
[hereinafter Euratom Treaty]. 
28
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 18, No. 1 [1992], Art. 10
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol18/iss1/10
1992] Canada's Constitutional Crisis 251 
Rome on March 25, 1957. 
A distinction between the three existing treaties was apparent. 
ECSC and Euratom, were viewed as sectoral. 225 In contrast, the prin-
cipal function of the EEC was to establish a common market and the 
progressive approximation of the economic policies of the member na-
tions through "harmonious development of economic activities, a 
continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accel-
erated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between 
the states belonging to it. "226 
The foundation of the development was based on four basic prin-
ciples adopted by each member nation. These are: ( 1) free movement 
of goods between the member states;227 (2) a common agricultural 
policy;228 (3) the free movement of persons, 229 services230 and capi-
tal231; and (4) a series of common policies.232 While the EEC Treaty 
promotes commonality in these areas, it left subject to each member 
state, the harmonization of these policies. 233 
E. Integration and Enlargement 
Although the three treaties, ECSC, EEC and Euratom, were exe-
cuted in the same manner as traditional international agreements be-
tween sovereign states, the drafters were aware that they were 
creating something very different from traditional international 
law. 234 The EC Treaties create their own legal system based on fun-
damental principles upon which the development of a modem consti-
225. The two treaties were drafted to integrate specific sectors or markets common to the 
member states. See MATHUSEN 4th, supra note 205, at 108. 
226. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, art. 2. 
227. Id. arts. 9 - 37. 
228. Id. arts. 38 - 47. 
229. Id. arts. 48 - 51. 
230. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, arts. 59 - 66. 
231. Id. arts. 52 - 58, (7 - 73). 
232. Id. arts. 74 - 84. 
233. The member states are obligated to ensure their policies maintain an overall equilib-
rium in the balance of payments, confidence in currency, stable prices and high employment, 
all areas of common concern. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, arts. 103 - 09. 
234. See MATHUSEN 4th, supra note 205, at 1. In international law, sovereign states 
enter into agreements that create mutual obligations. In contrast, the states that signed the EC 
Treaties limited their own sovereign rights by transferring them to institutions over which they 
have no direct control, and endowed them with powers they will not always possess them-
selves. See Herzog, supra note 206, at 513. Professor Herzog noted in passing that "in spite of 
the somewhat technical language the drafters viewed this as much more than just a regulation 
of an industry. They hoped it would provide the basis for a future of closer cooperation among 
the peoples of Europe . ... " Id. 
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tutional framework can be established. 235 
F. Merger of the Three Communities 
The next major transformation in the composition of the EC was 
the adoption of the Merger Treaty on April 8, 1965.236 This agree-
ment merged the communities in fact, though not from a strictly legal 
point of view, by placing them all under the control of common 
institutions. 237 
Originally, the ECSC was guided by a supra-national High Au-
thority with wide regulatory and administrative powers over the 
member states and individual firms. 238 In contrast, the EEC and 
Euratom were less supra-national than the ECSC. For example,the 
EEC Treaty created a Commission as the executive rather than a 
High Authority.239 Its independent decision-making powers were 
much narrower than were those given to the ECSC High 
Authority.240 
The Merger Treaty provided for one Commission,241 one Council 
of Ministers, 242 one European Parliament243 and one European Court 
of Justice for all three Communities.244 The Commission, sitting in 
Brussels, is composed of seventeen members who hold office for four 
235. The law was originally termed "supra-national." The reasoning was that all mem-
ber states had to apply Community law over their domestic law, and that law was common to 
all member states. See MA THUSEN 4th, supra note 205, at 2. 
236. Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European 
Communities, April 8, 1965 in force July 1, 1967 reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 776 (1965) [hereinafter 
Merger Treaty]. 
237. See MATHUSEN 5th, supra note 17, at 8. 
238. The High Authority was comprised of nine independent personalities appointed by 
the governments of the Six. It consulted a Council of Ministers composed of representatives of 
the member state's government for consent on certain acts. The High Authority was con-
trolled judicially by the Court of Justice. See ECSC Treaty, supra note 16, arts. 7 - 19. 
239. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, art. 4(1); Euratom Treaty, supra note 224, art. 3(1). 
240. The distinction between the two is apparent from the nature of the treaties. The 
ECSC was a treaty-law (traite-regles) which enumerated rules for every situation and thus the 
High Authority's discretion could not be expanded. In contrast, the EEC treaty is an outline 
treaty (traite-cadre) which sets out broad principles which the legislative body it created would 
have to enact upon from time to time. See Giancarlo Olmi, The ECSC the First European 
Federal Structure, in THIRTY YEARS, supra note 21, at 2. 
241. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, arts. 155 - 63. 
242. See Merger Treaty, supra note 236, arts. 1 - 8; EEC Treaty, supra note 223, arts. 145 
- 54. 
243. See Merger Treaty, supra note 236, arts. 9 - 19; EEC Treaty, supra note 223, arts. 
137 - 44. 
244. See Merger Treaty, supra note 236, art. 30; EEC Treaty, supra note 223, arts. 164 -
88. 
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years and are chosen by mutual agreement of the member states. 245 
The role of the Commission is to be the "initiator and co-coordinator 
of Community policy; it is the executive agency of the Community; it 
is the guardian of the Community Treaties. "246 
A representative from each member state sits on the Council of 
Ministers.247 The Council meets periodically, normally in Brussels or 
Luxembourg. 248 The voting rules of the Council vary according to 
the subject matter being discussed, but its principal role is as the legis-
lative body of the EC. It enacts legislation, subject to the powers of 
the Commission and European Parliament, and "ensure[s] coordina-
tion of the general economic policies of the member states. "249 
The Assembly, or European Parliament, consists of representa-
tives from each member state. The 518 representatives are elected by 
direct universal suffrage. 250 Although this body has no direct legisla-
tive powers, it does have the power to affect proposals in certain in-
stances when acting in cooperation with the Council and 
Commission. 251 The European Parliament has three months to ap-
prove, amend, or reject proposals submitted to it by the Council. 252 
Proposals. may be sent back to the Commission for re-examination. 253 
However, there is no binding force behind opinions issued or amend-
ments proposed by the Parliament. 254 In contrast, the European Par-
liament has the power to amend and the sole power to approve the 
annual budget of the EC. 2ss 
The Court of Justice also sits in Luxembourg and is composed of 
thirteen judges256 and six advocate generals. 257 In general, the Court 
is a catalyst for integration by ensuring that EC law takes effect 
within each member state's legal system. 258 The Court can hear dis-
245. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, art. 158. 
246. See LASOK, supra note 18, at 112. 
247. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, art. 146. 
248. Id. art. 147. 
249. Id. art. 145. 
250. Id. art. 138(3). France, Germany, Italy and the U.K. have 81 representatives; Spain 
60, Netherlands 25, Belgium, Portugal, and Greece 24, Denmark 16, Ireland 15 and Luxem-
bourg 6. Id. art. 138(2). 
251. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, art. 149(2). 
252. Id. 
253. Id. art. 149(2)(d). 
254. See MATHIJSEN 5th, supra note 17, at 22. 
255. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, art. 203. 
256. Id. art. 165. 
257. See id. art. 166. 
258. The Court of Justice has ruled that Community law must take direct effect in mem-
ber states and become part of the national law. See Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nether-
lands, 1963 E.C.R. 1, [1963] CMLR 105. 
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putes between states, citizens and corporations concerning EC law. 2s9 
Therefore, the EC is comprised of three distinct legal communities 
established by separate treaties all operating under one legal order. 260 
At the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, a timetable of 
twelve years was set as the transitional period for creating a common 
market in all sectors of the economy.261 Economic prosperity in the 
early sixties put the Six ahead of schedule. In December 1964, the 
Commission moved to adopt a plan for rapid development of a single 
market. It was proposed that the EC finance all expenditures on a 
common agricultural policy, reform EC financial arrangements and 
strengthen the power of the European Parliament. 262 
However, the strengthening of the EC institutions was not ac-
ceptable to all member nations. Specifically, in June 1965, France re-
fused to take its Council seat because agricultural policy talks were 
deadlocked. 263 This action prevented the Council from making any 
further decisions. r 
The conflict was resolved in Janu~ 1966 by the "Luxembourg 
Compromise. "264 The member states appeased France's objection to 
the proposed changes to the EC, especially their worries over majority 
voting on subjects that affected vital interests of member nations. 26s 
The other countries agreed they would try to obtain unanimous con-
sent on all future decisions. 266 
The Community continued to progress in spite of these set-backs. 
Guided by the principles of the Schuman Plan, the Community lead-
ers focused on coordinating the sovereign power which each member 
state had transferred to the EC into one harmonious federation. This 
259. See Herzog, supra note 206, at 530. 
260. The citizens living in a member state refer to the three legally distinct communities 
as the "European Community." Therefore, it was decided by the European Parliament and 
the Council that the term "European Community" would be used on all official documents 
except for legislation whenever possible and appropriate. See Resolution of 16 February 1978 
on a Single Designation for the Community, 63 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. 13.3) 36 (1978). 
261. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, art. 8. See SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 222, at 1 -
111 to 1 - 113 (discussing the so-called acceleration decisions and a general background to art. 
8). 
262. See THIRTY YEARS, supra note 21, at 5. 
263. Id. 
264. Luxembourg Compromise reprinted in 3 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 469 (1966). See 
also Herzog, supra note 206, at 517. 
265. See THIRTY YEARS, supra note 21, at 5. 
266. Id. Although not a fully binding agreement, the effort to obtain unanimous consent 
on future decisions became the common practice of the Council and is known as the Luxem-
bourg Compromise. See Herzog, supra note 206, at 518 - 19. 
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approach has allowed the diverse member states of the EC to advance 
with unanimous consent. 
This positive move forward was enhanced by subsequent meet-
ings between the leaders of the governments of the member states, 
beginning in December 1969. During this Summit Conference at the 
Hague, it was decided that the respective Foreign Ministers would 
study potential steps to achieve political unification and consider ways 
to enlarge the EC. 261 
The product of these meetings was the first report of the Foreign 
Ministers. 268 According to this report, the plan called for cooperation 
and consultation between member states who were to harmonize their 
policies and encourage joint action. This report also laid the founda-
tion for a system calling for the Foreign Ministers to meet four times 
a year in political cooperation outside the strict framework of the 
EEC Treaty, thereby enhancing the ability of the EC to speak with 
one voice on common issues. 269 
G. The First Enlargement 
On January 22, 1972·, the Treaty of Brussels concerning the ac-
cession of United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Norway was 
signed. 270 This Treaty and the appended Act concerning the acces-
sion of the new members modified the existing Treaties to address the 
problems created by the accession of new member states to the EC.271 
The institutions were adapted to assimilate the new members, and 
transitional arrangements were implemented to allow for smooth inte-
gration. 272 The Treaty of Brussels was ratified by the governments of 
Ireland, Denmark and the United Kingdom, but not Norway.273 
Thus, by 1973 the EC had nine member nations. 
Throughout the seventies, the European Union was faced with 
economic hardship. The oil embargo of 1972 by OPEC and the 
destabilization of the U.S. dollar caused market shocks that put EC 
267. See SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 222, at P - 11. 
268. Adopted October 27, 1970. Id. 
269. Decided at the Paris Summit, October, 1972. Id. at P - 12. 
270. Treaty of Brussels, Jan. 22, 1972, in force Jan. 1, 1973, reprinted in TREATIES Es-
T ABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: TREATIES AMENDING THESE TREATIES ( 1978). 
271. See MATHUSEN 5th, supra note 17, at 10. 
272. See THIRTY YEARS, supra note 21, at 7. 
273. In a May election, 83% of the Irish voters said "yes." In September 1972, 63.5% of 
the Danish electorate said "yes" and in October the House of Commons in Britain passed the 
European Communities Act by a wide majority. Notably 53% of the Norwegians voting on 
the referendum said "no." Id. 
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members on economic alert.274 However, the European Union re-
mained one cohesive entity throughout this period of serious eco-
nomic hardship. 
Greece applied for membership on June 12, 1975, and after con-
ditions for accession were formalized, it became the tenth member in 
January 1981.21s Portugal and Spain applied for membership in 1977. 
The Treaty of Accession and Act concerning the conditions of acces-
sion was concluded in Madrid on June 12, 1985, and were effective 
January 1, 1986.276 The EC now consists of twelve member states. 
H. The Single European Act and "1992" 
In the early eighties, a downturn in the world economy affected 
EC progress. Some members were unhappy with the way the EC was 
carrying out the financing and distribution of funds. Other members 
were concerned with increasing Community expenditures and a corre-
sponding downturn in revenues. 277 The European Parliament, recog-
nizing the need for greater political unity, proposed a draft Treaty for 
a European Union in 1984.278 Additionally, the Commission issued a 
"White Paper" on the completion of the EC internal market.279 To-
gether these two documents represented movement toward comple-
tion of a single internal market set for December 31, 1992.280 
The result of this push forward was the Single European Act281 
designed to implement institutional changes to the EC which would 
facilitate further harmonization between the members. This instru-
ment contained four major areas of concern: (1) provisions concern-
ing political cooperation in foreign policy; (2) provisions to complete 
the internal market by 1992; (3) provisions conferring new areas of 
competence in substantive areas of law on the EC institutions; and ( 4) 
provisions that alter the way the EC institutions operate. 282 These 
changes affected the decision making process of the EC. By removing 
274. See Herzog, supra note 206, at 521. 
275. See Documents Concerning the Accession of the Hellenic Republic to the European 
Communities, 22 0.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 291)(1979). 
276. See Documents Concerning the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portugese 
Republic to the European Communities, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 302)(1985). 
277. See Herzog, supra note 206, at 526. 
278. Draft Treaty on European Union, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 77) at 33 (1984). 
279. Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the Commission to the European 
Council, Milan, June 28 - 29, 1985, 85 COM. 310 (1985). 
280. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, art. 8(a). 
281. Single European Act, 25 I.L.M. 503 (1986). 
282. See J.A. Usher, The Institutions of the European Communities After the Single Euro-
pean Act, 19 BRACTON L. J. 64 (1987). 
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the unanimity rule when adopting Directives which eliminate techni-
cal trade barriers, and replacing it with a qualified majority voting 
rule, 283 the movement toward a single internal market was 
launched. 284 
Today, the member states and the institutions of the EC are plan-
ning for the December 31, 1992, completion of the internal market. 
The EC's internal economic market represents twelve member states, 
communicating in ten official languages, composed of 327 million in-
dividuals who produce a Gross Domestic Product of $4.8 billion an-
nually. 285 This strict economic structure represents one part of the 
European Union. In addition to the economic treaties, the member 
states also engage in inter-governmental cooperation in several polit-
ical areas. 
L The Maastricht Summit: The Next Phase of European 
Integration 
The internal market is planned to be completed by the end of 
1992. This is a significant year in the history of the EC. It marks the 
beginning of its transformation into a European Union.286 On De-
cember 11, 1991, the heads of the governments of the 12 member 
states concluded a summit conference on the future of Europe in 
Maastricht, the Netherlands (Maastricht Summit).287 The Maastricht 
Summit conference produced a document establishing criteria for eco-
nomic and monetary union (E.M. U.) by as early as 1996 and no later 
than 1999. 288 This will strengthen the existing economic structure of 
the EC. Additionally, and more significantly, it calls for political 
union among member states in foreign policy and security. This 
agreement was formalized in a signed treaty among the 12 member 
states on Friday, February 8, 1992. 
The Maastricht Summit calls for fixed exchange rates and a sin-
283. See Herzog, supra note 206, at 528. 
284. See MICHAEL CALINGAERT, THE 1992 CHALLENGE FROM EUROPE: DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY'S INTERNAL MARK.ET 11 ( 1988). 
285. See STATISTICAL OFFICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, BASIC STATISTICS OF 
THE CoMMUNITY 99, 39 (28th ed. 1991)(The population figure is for 1990. The Gross Domes-
tic Product figure is for 1989, which was reported as 4,406,900 ECU. An ECU, European 
Currency Unit, is a basket unit based on a certain quantity of each member states currency, 
weighted on the basis of the average gross national product over five years (1969 - 73) and of 
the intra-Community trade of each member state. In 1989, the conversion rate for one ECU 
was $1.27(U.S.)). 
286. Programme of the Commission/or 1992, RAPID, Feb. 12, 1992, at para. 1, available 
in LEXIS, EUROPE Library, ALLNWS File. 
287. Maastricht Summit Succeeds, supra note 19. 
288. Id. 
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gle currency for all member states by no later than January 1, 1999. 
If, however, by January 1, 1996, some member states have satisfied a 
set of economic criteria, 289 then the formation of a European Central 
Bank and a single currency will begin. 290 If no members have satisfied 
the economic criteria by 1998, then the members will meet and decide 
which states qualify to begin the process on January 1, 1999.291 To 
ensure that the E.M.U. is achieved, an European Monetary Institute 
will be created in 1994 which will eventually become the European 
Central Bank. 292 
In addition, the leaders at the Maastricht Summit agreed to an 
"even closer union among the people of Europe"293 by calling for 
political union among the member states. The plan will begin, as 
other proposals for change in the European Union have been initi-
ated, by unifying small areas of what was formally under the domestic 
control of each member state. First, it provides for a common foreign 
and security policy which will operate at the inter-governmental 
level. 294 In 1996, this will be reviewed to see if it should remain at the 
inter-governmental level or be placed under the power of the institu-
tions of the EC. 295 The Maastricht Summit increases the power of the 
European Parliament concerning legislation in certain areas. 296 
Additionally, immigration and asylum for all the member states 
will also be dealt with through inter-governmental cooperation. 297 
The proposals at the Maastricht Summit, if ratified, will create a Eu-
ropean Police Intelligence agency (Europol) to deal with drug traffick-
ing and organized crime. 298 It will also establish a European 
citizenship and create a cohesion fund to provide economic aid to the 
poorer member states. 299 Enlargement negotiations, which concern a 
289. Although the text of the Maastricht Summit was not available, several sources re-
ported the economic criteria as including: I) an inflation rate not more than 1.5 percentage 
points higher than the EC's three lowest rates among member states; 2) a budget deficit not in 
excess of three percent of Gross Domestic Product; 3) a long term interest rate not more than 
two percentage points higher than the EC's three lowest; and 4) no devaluations of a currency 
against any other within the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System for 
at least two years. Id. 
290. Id. 
291. Maastricht Summit Succeeds, supra note 19. As part of the compromise at Maas-




295. Making Sense of Maastricht, supra note 20, at 14. 
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states application for membership into the EC, will be accelerated. 300 
Finally, the Maastricht Summit provides for more qualified majority 
voting in the Council. 301 
As the European Union completes the final stages of economic 
integration, the proposed changes at the Maastricht Summit have be-
gun the movement towards closer political ties among the member 
states. The European Union is transforming from a sophisticated 
trading bloc into a clearly identifiable group. 302 Since it was created, 
the European Union has been contemplated to encompass more than 
just economic regulation. The founders realized political constraints 
existed which would not allow complete integration to be achieved by 
one agreement at one point in time. Therefore, it has developed 
slowly, integrating the diverse member states first economically and 
now politically. This framework under which the member states have 
been brought together represents what has been called a constitutional 
order.303 
V. OPTIONS FOR A NEW CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 
A. The Range of Possible Solutions 
In the wake of the Quebec Commission's request for proposals 
for a new Canadian federal scheme, numerous suggestions have sur-
faced. One Canadian scholar points out that a new federal order 
could take several forms, 304 ranging from an unlikely status quo 
model to a "radically asymmetrical federation. "303 The proposals fall 
into three general categories covering a continuum of structural mod-
els. 306 At one extreme, new federal orders have been suggested. 
These would resemble the existing order in Canada where sovereignty 
is divided between provincial and federal governments. Any federal 
form would require a reallocation of the powers and responsibilities at 
each level of government. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, two separate and distinct 
sovereign states would be created out of the existing federal order. 
300. Making Sense of Maastricht, supra note 20, at 14. 
301. Id. See also discussion supra text at part IV.F. 
302. Id. 
303. See CALINGAERT, supra note 284, at 11. 
304. Ronald L. Watts is a Professor of Political Studies at Queen's University who spe-
cializes in the creation, operation and disintegration of old and new federations. OPTIONS, 
supra note 7, at xvii. 
305. Id. at 24. 
306. See Ronald Watts, Canada's Constitutional Options: An Outline, in OPTIONS, supra 
note 7, at 24. 
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This would fulfill the goals of the separatists in Quebec. It would 
require that all economic and political ties between Quebec and the 
rest of Canada be severed. Canada's $400 billion national debt and all 
financial assets would have to be divided between the two new 
states. 307 In addition, many questions arise from this model concern-
ing the Atlantic provinces which would be cut off from the rest of 
Canada. Still other questions center on the status of existing treaty 
relationships with other nations, and the possible revisions to the re-
maining Canadian federal order. 308 
In the middle of the continuum, a new institutional structure 
could be created based on a confederal model. Here, the characteris-
tics of the sovereign states would remain vested in each member, but a 
superstructure would be organized to manage common policies with 
approval from member states. 309 This form of political order would 
resemble the P.Q. 's "sovereignty association."310 Additionally, this 
model could take the form of a common market such as the EC. Ca-
nadian scholars who had previously looked at the EC as a possible 
solution to Canada's former constitutional problems rejected it as a 
comprehensive model for change. 311 It was argued that by adopting 
an EC model, Canada would ignore its historical reality. The EC was 
designed to promote unity and develop centralization, whereas Can-
ada's historical dynamic is one of decentralization.312 However, given 
the inevitable re-negotiation of the Canadian federation, scholars ex-
amining developments in Europe today maintain that while it may 
not be a model that can be directly adopted, it exemplifies the ingenu-
ity that can be employed to create institutions around which a consti-
tutional framework can be organized.313 Additionally, these scholars 
had looked at Europe before the European Union Treaty existed 
which may now make it a more suitable model to follow. 
307. See Martin Cohn, Why Quebec Debt Report Doesn't Add Up, TORONTO STAR, July 
20, 1991, (Insight) at Dl. 
308. See Ronald Watts, Canada's Constitutional Options: An Outline, in OPTIONS, supra 
note 7, at 27. 
309. Id. at 24. 
310. See discussion supra text part 11.C. 
311. See , e.g., David Matas, The EEC as a Model for Canada, 10 MANITOBA L.J. 259 
(1980). 
312. Id. at 279-80. 
313. See Dan Soberman, European Integration: Are there Lessons for Canada?, in OP-
TIONS, supra note 7, at 205. 
38
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 18, No. 1 [1992], Art. 10
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol18/iss1/10
1992] Canada's Constitutional Crisis 
B. The Federal Government's New Proposal to Shape 
the Future of Canada 
261 
The idea of a new federal order based on the experience in Eu-
rope has been incorporated into the federal government's new propo-
sal for constitutional change. On September 24, 1991, the Canadian 
House of Commons received a document from Prime Minister Mulro-
ney entitled Shaping Canada's Future Together.314 The document 
contains twenty-eight sections each of which is a proposal for consti-
tutional reform including many similar to those contained in the 
Meech Lake Accord.31 ' It also contains a host of new proposals 
which are more ambitious and far reaching than the Accord. In par-
ticular, it proposes changes which would lay the foundation for an 
economic union modeled implicitly on the EC. 
The government's reform package is broken down into three 
parts separately titled: I) Shared Citizenship And Diversity; II) Re-
sponsive Institutions For A Modem Canada; and Ill) Preparing For 
A More Prosperous Future. Part I addresses the meaning of being a 
Canadian and recognizes the diversity within the country. It recog-
nizes the rights of aboriginal peoples to participate in the current con-
stitutional deliberations and reaffirms Quebec's distinctiveness. 
In addition, section 7 of the proposal calls for the incorporation 
of a "Canada Clause" into the Constitution Act. This would be the 
corollary to Quebec's distinct society clause in section 2. It would 
contain specific characteristics and values acknowledging who 
Canadians are and who they aspire to be. Characteristics such as 
equality of men and women, responsibility to protect and preserve the 
environment and a contribution to building a strong Canada of peo-
ples from many cultures and lands are included. 
Section 7 would also add a clause that would establish the free 
flow of people, goods, services and capital as a basic Canadian charac-
teristic. This language is the centerpiece of the EC's economic union. 
The EEC Treaty specifically enumerates these as the bases for devel-
oping a common market between its members.316 By adopting this as 
a fundamental characteristic, Canada would shape a federal order 
similar to the EC. 
Building on these basic characteristics, part II of the new propo-
314. See Shaping a New Future, supra note 12. 
315. Most notably section 2 recognizing Quebec's Distinctiveness, section 9 and 10 aimed 
at Senate reform, section 12 addressing Supreme Court appointments, section 13 proposing an 
amending formula and section 19 covering immigration. Id. 
316. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, arts. 9, 48-73. 
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sal would reform existing federal institutions. The result would be 
equitable representation and effective control in each branch of gov-
ernment for the provinces and the territories. The most significant 
change would be to the Senate. It would become an elected body, but 
remain secondary to the House of Commons as a legislative body. 
Finally, the federal government's proposal calls for a change to the 
Supreme Court appointment procedure and the constitutional amend-
ing formula. 
While the first two parts of the reform package hint at an eco-
nomic union, part III makes it clear that the Canadian federal govern-
ment wants to move towards an European model. Specifically, 
section 14 would add a "common market clause" to the Constitution 
Act, which would provide that "Canada is an economic union within 
which persons, goods, services and capital may move freely without 
barriers or restrictions based on provincial or territorial barriers."317 
This section would prohibit both the Parliament and Government of 
Canada, and the legislatures and governments of the provinces from 
contravening this principle by law or practice.31s 
The Parliament of Canada would have the exclusive power to 
make laws for the efficient functioning of the economic union under 
the proposed section 15.319 This section, however, requires that any 
law made pursuant to this section must receive approval from two-
thirds of the provinces to have effect. 320 
Section 16 calls for the harmonization of provincial and federal 
economic policies. This is identical to the language in the EEC 
Treaty that establishes such harmonization as a fundamental princi-
pal of the common market.321 The federal government would im-
prove the coordination of the budget-making process as well as 
monetary and fiscal policies among the provinces. Lastly, an in-
dependent agency would be established to monitor and evaluate the 
macroeconomic policies of the provinces and the federal government. 
Finally, the last proposal indicates that the federal government 
envisions that the future constitutional order in Canada will be based 
on an economic union modeled after the EC. Section 28 calls for the 
creation of a "Council of the Federation. " 322 This Council would be 
317. Shaping a New Furture, supra note 12, sec. 14(1). 
318. Id. sec. 14(2). 
319. Id. sec. 15(1). 
320. Id. sec. 15(2). 
321. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, art. 2. 
322. Shaping a New Future, supra note 12, sec. 28. 
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added to the constitutional framework of Canada. 323 It would be 
composed of federal, provincial and territorial governments who 
would "decide issues of inter-governmental coordination and collabo-
ration. " 324 Its mandate would be to vote on proposed legislation 
aimed at enhancing the functioning of the economic union under sec-
tion 15. Thus, the major institutional change of this proposed Cana-
dian federal order would be the addition of a governmental body like 
the Council established by the EEC Treaty. This is evidence that the 
Europe's successful experience has influenced Canadian deci-
sionmakers in their efforts to create a new constitutional order. 
C. The European Union: A Viable Solution for Canada? 
The federal government's proposed constitutional reforms, dis-
cussed above, incorporate an economic union into its vision of a new 
Canada. Other commentators also believe that the inevitable re-nego-
tiation of the present federal order could result in one resembling the 
emerging European Union. This new model of constitutional order, 
as it has emerged in western Europe, provides Canada with a viable 
course to follow when making changes to its fundamental legal order. 
It will provide a stable economic union upon which closer political 
ties can slowly be established among the provinces, territories and ab-
original peoples. 
What has emerged from the European experience, is a formula 
for integrating diverse societies under one legal order, sharing in its 
burdens and benefitting from its successes. The structure, as it has 
materialized, is one that is socially legitimate, because it has unani-
mous approval from all the member nations. It forms the basic com-
mon legal order that all the member states must follow and therefore 
represents a constitutional framework under which diverse national 
identities can co-exist. 
A European Union type of federation would allow all the prov-
inces to remain united in one Canadian legal order. The debate in 
Canada over constitutional change has forced every province to reex-
amine its own identity. In this regard, establishing a European Union 
framework would allow each province to maintain and promote its 
unique cultural identity. This is especially true for Quebec which has 
demanded constitutional recognition of its distinctness within Can-
ada. Each province would retain a large degree of sovereignty to en-
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worked in Europe and is perhaps the modem way in which sophisti-
cated groups will agree to be part of a larger legal order. 
Additionally, the historical context and the founding principles 
of the Schuman Plan provide insight to the foundation of the success-
ful development of the European Union. The original member states 
united in order to preserve peace and minimize the threat of German 
re-militarization. Today, Canada does not face any type of internal 
military threat, but does have an impending social need to define its 
national identity. By establishing certain principles to guide the for-
mation of a Canadian legal order, the provinces could begin a new era 
of integration. The result would be a constitutional framework that 
develops slowly, but is socially and legally legitimate because it has 
the approval of all its members. 
The provinces realize that the breakdown of the Canadian union 
as it exists today would have a negative economic impact in every 
province. Unanimous agreement on a legal order could be reached if 
fundamental principles were developed and aimed at the creation of 
an economic union. This would allow each province to maintain a 
large degree of control in its internal affairs while benefiting from the 
larger economic market in which it could participate. First, the prov-
inces could maintain the economic ties that are already exist in Can-
ada. These bonds range from a common currency, to a federal 
monetary system, to common trade agreements with third countries. 
This economic framework would form the basis for allowing the prov-
inces to develop closer political ties over time. 
The provinces have been unable to agree on a federal structure 
proposed by one document, such as the recent Accord or the original 
BNA Act. The European Union began over forty years ago by focus-
ing on economic integration and now, after the Maastricht Summit, 
political integration. If the Canadian provinces can reach consensus 
on an economic order, then they can move slowly toward closer polit-
ical union. Given the complexity of the competing interests through-
out Canada, 32s this solution may have a greater likelihood of success 
than trying to create in one document an acceptable constitutional 
structure before Quebec's October 1992 deadline. 
325. See Thomas J. Courchene & John N. McDougall, The Context for Future Constitu-
tional Options, in OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 33-51. The authors define the context for change 
broadly including "geographic determinism (both physical and socio-economic), demolinguis-
tics (the interaction among language, culture, and population), globalization and its impact on 
nation states, Canada - U.S. free trade, debt - and deficit-driven fiscal decentralization and 
aspects of the institutional/political malaise across [Canada]." Id. at 34. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Since 1867, when the first Canadian union was established, the 
provinces, especially Quebec, have struggled to create a federal order 
acceptable to all. The failure of the Meech Lake Accord, the latest 
attempt to resolve this dilemma, has made the reorganization or the 
breakdown of the present Canadian order inevitable. As other federal 
orders around the world also experience regional self-determination, a 
model for collective federal unification has evolved in western Europe. 
The European Union has brought together culturally and politically 
diverse states under one common legal order, with each retaining the 
power to promote its own unique identity. Its basic institutions were 
founded on fundamental principles that have guided it through eco-
nomic and political integration. 
The context for constitutional change in Canada is marked by 
complex competing factors and forces. Such an environment does not 
lend itself to the creation of a constitutional structure based on one all 
encompassing document. A new era of integration could begin by 
establishing certain fundamental principles that receive unanimous 
agreement. These principles would re-define the Canadian federal or-
der according to the contemporary constitutional values of all the 
provinces, territories and aboriginal peoples. The existing federal or-
der could be modified and institutions could be established guided by 
these principles. They would first establish an economic union based 
on the existing Canadian infra-structure. This would set the stage for 
slow political integration. Thus, following the European Union's 
model of constitutional change could teach Canada a timely lesson in 
its search for a new constitutional configuration. 
Anthony J. Davis 
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